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Declining welfare systems increase the importance of self-determination in pension decisions. Thus, the
stability of long-life consumption markedly relies on individual long-range planning attitude. Our paper
investigates how behavioural traits affect this attitude and influence the probability of holding voluntary
integrative pension schemes (VIPS). We find that psychophysiological heterogeneity plays a role in pre-
dicting demand for VIPS, together with saving/indebtedness style and conventional sociodemographic
characteristics. Specifically, individuals who have a high degree of non-planning impulsiveness, and who
are inclined to intense psychophysiological arousals, are less likely to demand VIPS. Our results imply
that behavioural individualities might prompt individuals to postpone, or even neglect, decisions necessary
to maintain stable lifestyles in the long range.
Keywords: long-range planning attitude; psychophysiological heterogeneity; integrative pension
schemes; impulsivity; Skin Conductance Response
JEL Classification: G02; G28; D14; D87
1. Introduction
This paper investigates how psychophysiological heterogeneity affects long-range planning atti-
tude. We examine whether some personality traits and psychophysiological inclinations influence
the probability of holding voluntary integrative pension schemes (VIPS), while controlling for
saving/indebtedness style and sociodemographic characteristics.
In pension decisions, self-determination and self-control increasingly determine individual
choices and behaviours. This is the case of declining welfare systems that ask individuals, world-
wide, to make autonomous decisions in order to maintain stable lifestyles for the long term.
Retirement income systems of many OECD countries are increasingly relying on private, or
more generally funded, pensions, often organized as defined contribution (DC) plans (2012).1
Unlike public pensions, private schemes are voluntary in many countries (OECD 2012). As a
result, participation in and contributions to these plans are largely individual choices, and may
lead to disparities in coverage and contribution rates across populations and between countries
(OECD 2012).
Self-determination in long-range retirement planning implies that individuals determine the
proper beginning and amount of saving, as well as the appropriate investment strategy. In addi-
tion, participants in DB pensions should also evaluate whether retirement plans are going to
provide forward income sufficient to preserve quality of life during retirement; or, conversely,
∗Corresponding author. Email: barbara.alemanni@unibocconi.it
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2 B. Alemanni and C. Lucarelli
whether they should self-organize with supplemental plans, such as VIPS. These voluntary inte-
grative schemes may take different forms in different countries depending on both regulation
and the range of supply by the financial system. However, most often they appear as collective
pension funds similar to US 401(k) plans or individual schemes in the form of life insurance.
Both theoretical literature and empirical evidence indicate that individuals face a series of
obstacles in developing a long-range planning attitude. Some of these pitfalls refer to cogni-
tive biases that emerge when dealing with concepts such as discount rates and probabilities
(Thaler 1981; Ainslie and Haslam 1992; Lusardi and Mitchell 2009, 2011). Some others might
be related to personality traits, such as self-esteem in decisional tasks or impulsivity. Finally, a
concurring affective component may influence decision-making, especially in a long-range per-
spective (among others, McClure et al. 2004, 2007; Weber and Johnson 2009; Reimann and
Bechara 2010). This paper contributes mainly to this third stream of research, also known as
neuroeconomics. This relatively new field of studies applies tools and approaches from cog-
nitive neuroscience, such as imaging of brain activity and other techniques inferring how the
brain works, to analyse economic decision-making (Rustichini 2005; Glimcher 2011, among
others). It is an eclectic approach combining and extending methods from behavioural and
experimental economics with those from neuroscience and psychology, including experimental,
evolutionary, cognitive, ecological and social psychology. This paper pays particular attention
to the findings of cognitive neuroscientists who take a multiple-system approach, focusing on
the insight that the brain is composed of different interacting systems, for example, automatic
and controlled systems’ interactions. As Glimcher (2003) observes, neuroeconomics analyses
take Plato’s metaphor from classical philosophy: behaviour is like a chariot pulled by the two
horses of appetite and spirits and guided by the ‘charioteer’ of reason. Abandoning the strict
dichotomy between rational and irrational, neuroeconomics recognizes the important role played
by emotions in guiding economic and financial decisions.
Taking further steps in the field of neuroeconomics, this paper discusses a natural example of
migration from a public-oriented to a private-integrated pension system: the Italian retirement
system. We observe a qualified sample of 645 Italians with an appropriate participation in VIPS.
From traditional questionnaires and psychophysiological experiments, we discern personality
traits and emotional inclinations, together with saving/indebtedness style and sociodemographic
characteristics; in a multivariate probit model, we relate this information to retirement decisions
assumed in real life.
Our findings indicate that individuals who have a high degree of non-planning impulsiveness,
and who are inclined to intense psychophysiological arousal, are less likely to demand VIPS,
when controlling for saving/indebtedness style and sociodemographic variables. This supports
evidence that some behavioural individualities may induce lack of foresight and uncertainty of
life-quality standards during retirement.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews literature concerning cognitive and
emotional components that influence human decision-making in long-range planning; Section
3 contextualizes the empirical analysis within the declining welfare of the Italian case study;
Section 4 describes methods, models and research hypotheses; Section 5 depicts results of
multivariate analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2. Long-range planning attitude: cognitive and non-cognitive pitfalls
The life-cycle model is the standard framework for designing intertemporal allocation of time,
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the sum of period utility discounted to the present, multiplied by the probability of survival
from the agent’s current age to the oldest possible lifetime (among others, see Lusardi and
Mitchell 2009). Such a model implies several strong hypotheses: first, that households are able
to formulate expectations regarding prospective survival probabilities, discount rates, invest-
ment returns, gross and net earnings, pensions and Social Security benefits, as well as inflation.
Second, it assumes that individuals can rationally employ these data to plan and make optimal
consumption/saving choices.
Real-world investigation shows that households behave differently from what models postu-
late, because of either under- or, more often, overconsuming. This supposed ‘misconsumption’
might be the result of ill-suited life-cycle models failing to include subjective life-expectancy
probabilities distribution. In fact, people save for retirement based on their personal expected
length of life (Hamermesh 1985; Hurd and McGarry 2002). In general, poor financial literacy is
argued to be one reason for people fail planning far into the future (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, Q4
2008, 2009, 2011). In addition, research on intertemporal choices (Thaler 1981; Akerlof 1991;
Ainslie 1992) includes demonstrations of the ‘pervasive devaluation of the future’, as described
by Ainslie and Haslam (1992). Individuals are willing to accept a small sum of money today
in exchange for a larger sum in the future (Thaler 1981). Thus, the value of the future conse-
quence (money, time or effort) appears smaller when viewed in the present (Hausman 1979;
Akerlof 1991; Soman 1998). This consequent bias towards the present is well explained by mod-
els of hyperbolic discounting, as in Strotz (1956), or quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as proposed
by Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999).
While individuals might make well-reasoned and prudent choices for the future, the tempo-
ral proximity to the stimuli often leads them to impulsively switch from their earlier selection.
This behaviour has often been represented by using models of multiple selves,2 referred to
as the existence of two distinct systems of decision processing, as in Plato’s metaphor.3 Sys-
tem 1 is described as automatic, fast, effortless, unconscious, associative, slow learning and
emotional, generally associated with baseline functioning. System 2 is painted as controlled,
slow, effortful, conscious, rule based, fast learning, affectively neutral and more computationally
demanding. Multiple systems have been extended and applied to economic situations. For exam-
ple, Bernheim and Rangel (2004) and Benhanbib and Bisin (2004) study consumption choices
and consumption–saving plans under ‘cold’ and ‘hot’ modes. Loewenstein and O’Donoghue
(2005) use this duality to explain, among other things, why people tend to exhibit an S-shaped
probability-weighting function. In another set of models pioneered by Thaler and Shefrin (1981)
and Shefrin and Thaler (1988), dual processes acquire a myopic versus forward-looking tem-
poral dimension: the individual is split into a long-term planner, interested in the future effects
of choices, and a short-sighted doer, interested in immediate gratification only. The authors use
the model to explain the benefits of commitment devices such as mandatory pension plans and
lump-sum bonuses in promoting savings.
Important support for such a point of view comes from neuroimaging investigations of
intertemporal choices for both primary (McClure et al. 2007) and secondary (McClure et al.
2004) rewards. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), these authors show that
decisions that involve at least some short-run trade-offs recruit both analytic and emotional brain
systems, whereas decisions that only involve long-run trade-offs primarily recruit the analytic
brain. These findings support the idea that System 1 involves a limbic brain, whereas System 2
occurs in a pre-frontal cortex one.
Technology strengthens the understanding of physiology of human decision-making. Human
















































4 B. Alemanni and C. Lucarelli
emotions are simultaneous to any decision-making act, with an effect that is not transient. Among
others, Wong, Xue, and Bechara (2011) integrate fMRI images with physiological measures,
in particular the Skin Conductance Response (SCR). Their results suggest that physiological
data, obtained from SCR, would complement fMRI findings in providing a more comprehensive
understanding of the physiological and neural mechanisms of decision-making. These findings
appear to be in line with Damasio’s (1994) Somatic Marker Hypothesis, which sees the decision-
making process as influenced by marker signals that arise in bioregulatory processes, including
those that express themselves in emotions and feelings; this influence can occur at multiple levels
of operation, some conscious and others non-conscious.
Our research investigates a large sample of individuals, and some experimental devices, such
as fMRI, are impracticable for hundreds of agents. Therefore, based on neuroscience evidence
of network synchronization between central and peripheral systems, we use measurement of
physiological arousal and associate it with individual emotional activation, related to System 1
and the limbic brain.
3. A declining welfare in pension systems: the Italian case study
The Italian pension system has undergone heavy reform during the last 20 years. A mandatory
public-pension pillar, Pillar I, was organized as a DB-earnings-related scheme and has been pro-
gressively transformed into a notional DC scheme. The changes did not apply to the financing,
which continued to be based on an intergenerational PAYG system. In order to counterbalance
the expected reduction in the replacement rate of public pensions, caused by the Pillar I reform,
a supplementary-funded pillar has been introduced. These supplementary schemes are the Italian
version of the VIPS and can take one of two forms: collective (Closed/Open Pension Funds),
similar in principle to the US 401(k), or individual (Open Pension Funds or Piani individuali
pensionistici – PIPs, a sort of life insurance), similar in principle to the US IRA. Supplementary
funds use mainly DC formulae. As part of these supplementary pension schemes, workers can
contribute, at minimum, their severance pay, the Trattamento di Fine Rapporto (TFR). The TFR)
is a form of deferred remuneration, which, unless funnelled to voluntary pension schemes, is paid
to employees at the moment when the employment contract ends for reasons like pensioning or
dismissal. The TFR is calculated by dividing the yearly gross salary by a fixed parameter of
13.5, which yields 7.41% of the remuneration: 6.91% is allocated to the employee and 0.5% to
a guarantee fund managed by a state agency (INPS), which intervenes in case the employerQ5
becomes insolvent. By law, the TFR is revaluated on a compounded basis yearly at 1.5 +
75% of the domestic inflation rate. In addition to TFR flows, workers can choose to commit
to VIPS further sums. In the case of voluntary addition, further contributions can come from
the employer (mandatory in case of closed funds, optional in the other forms). Regardless of the
form, contributions up to around 5000 euro are tax-deductible.
In spite of the reform leading to a drastic reduction in the substitution rate, relatively few
Italians workers embraced pensions outside Pillar I. In 2003, membership did not exceed 2.6
million, or only about 12% of the employed workforce. In 2005, in order to boost participation,
an automatic-enrolment scheme for private-sector employees was implemented by law. Entered
into force in 2007, the auto-enrolment is based on the payment into the pension fund of the
future annual flow of TFR (the initiative has been often called ‘the TFR reform’). In January
2007, individual workers were given a period of six months in order to decide whether to refuse
this arrangement (and consequently the automatic enrolment with the pension funds); in case
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Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent
(N = 645) (100) (N = 411) (100) (N = 573) (100)
Individuals holding
VIPS
314 48.68 159 38.69 301 52.53
Individuals without
VIPS
331 51.32 252 61.31 272 47.47
Notes: This table indicates, in column (a), absolute (Frequency) and relative (Per cent) number of individuals, from the
overall sample of interviewed (N = 645), who hold VIPS (314), compared to those without such integrative schemes
(331). In column (b), this table offers the same information when excluding the 234 asset managers and financial advisors,
that is, within a sub-sample of 411 individuals. In column (c), it offers the information when excluding the 72 pensioners,
that is, within a sub-sample of 573 individuals. Among these, only 13 underwrote VIPS. This is mainly due to the fact
that historically Italian retirement schemes relied on public pensions, and VIPS are a recent phenomenon (mid-2000s).
Mature cohorts of Italians can still largely rely on public pensions.
mechanism applies to all first-time employees. By law, the default investment line must guarantee
the repayment of the principal plus a yield comparable to TFR revaluation.
Unlike other successful national experiences, the Italian auto-enrolment scheme did not
remarkably increase participation. COVIP, the pension system watchdog, reports that by the end Q6
of 2012 membership reached around 5.8 million, still barely 25% of the employed workforce. In
analysing this poor result, Rinaldi (2011) notes the poor design of the default option combined
with the lack of unanimous consensus by the different parties involved (social parties, employers
and government) for such a process.
Given the minimal success of VIPS, in our empirical study we have been forced to recruit
a number of individuals with voluntary pension participation that over-represents the Italian
situation (49% with VIPS, 51% without; 39–61%, when financial professionals are excluded;
53–47%, when pensioners are excluded, as shown in Table 1). This is coherent with the collec-
tion of sociodemographic, psychological and psychophysiological information large enough to
include individuals both inside and outside voluntary pension schemes. Marginally, we note that
the participant rate increases when excluding pensioners because mature cohorts of Italians can
still largely rely on generous public pensions accrued before the recent reforms.
4. Methods, models and research hypotheses
4.1 Sample, experiment and questionnaire
The empirical analysis is developed within an Italian research project addressed to study
behavioural and emotional issues related to financial decision-making (Lucarelli and Brighetti
20104). A research team of economists and psychologists carried out an in-person survey that
involved a large sample of individuals in a psychophysiological experiment (N = 645). The
recruitment rule is that individuals must be directly responsible for their financial decisions.
This circumstance renders appropriate the investigation of a relationship between individual
















































6 B. Alemanni and C. Lucarelli
The recruitment rule explains two main features of our sample: first, a considerable share
(almost one third) of financial professionals (mainly online traders, asset managers and finan-
cial advisors6); second, a dominance of males (two-thirds), because our sample indirectly
reflects those who take care, in Italy, of household familial decisions.7 An overall description
of demographic and socio-economic profile of our sample is offered in Table 2.
The in-person psychophysiological trial requires the cooperation of financial institutions to
invite both employees and customers, and to host experiments inside their offices, across the
Italian territory. A stringent privacy statement ensures individuals’ anonymity. In order to recruit
people seriously committed to the task, a personal psychological profiling is given to participants,
as feedback, instead of a monetary reward.
We jointly submit a verbatim questionnaire with a psychophysiological experiment which
reproduces in a laboratory setting the context of individual decision-making under uncertainty.
We use the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) with the simultaneous measurement of the SCR, fol-
lowing Bechara and Damasio (2002), in order to assess the individual physiological arousal to
stimuli – here, monetary outcomes (Boucsein 1992; Figner and Murphy 2011).8
Briefly, the IGT simulates real-life decisions in conditions of uncertainty and requires an indi-
vidual to make a series of choices from decks A, B, C and D, which implies different gains
(rewards) and losses (punishments). According to the original definition of Bechara and Dama-
sio (2002, 1677), two of these decks (deck A and deck B) were defined as being ‘in the long run
disadvantageous’, because the risks they contained were not adequately rewarded and, at the end
of the task, individuals who preferred these decks ‘lost’; conversely, decks C and D were defined
as ‘advantageous’ because the risks unbundled in these decks were adequately rewarded. During
the task, participants sequentially select a card from four decks and receive a (virtual) monetary
outcome after each selection. The subject is not told the number of choices he/she will have to
make, even if he/she ultimately makes 100 choices.
While making IGT choices, that is, receiving positive or negative outcomes from choices,
individuals experience a physiological arousal, assessed via SCR. This measure comes from the
voltage drop between two electrodes placed on the skin surface. Electrodes are attached to the
palm surface of the second phalanx of the index and middle fingers of the non-dominant hand,
after the agent is seated in a comfortable chair in front of the computer screen where the sequence
of the IGT choices is displayed. Changes in SCR occur when the eccrine sweat glands, which are
innervated by the sympathetic autonomic nervous system fibres, receive a signal from a certain
part of the brain. Recording of SCR starts at least 10 minutes before the beginning of the IGT
and continues throughout. Filtering rate is set at 1 Hz.
Somatic reactions to IGT rewards and punishments are generated after each card selection so
that individuals begin to trigger anticipatory reactions that will guide their forthcoming choices,9
coherent with the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio 1994). In line with Bechara and Dama-
sio’s (1997) formulation, we measure the value of SCR that individuals show before the choiceQ7
of disadvantageous decks, and we refer to this value as a measure of emotional arousal of
individuals in the context of risky situations.
The verbatim questionnaire includes an impulsivity test – the BIS-11 questionnaire of Patton,
Stanford, and Barratt (1995) – as well as a wide range of questions concerning sociodemographic
information that is used to set descriptive variables and controls. Part of the questionnaire collects
information about personal financial choices, such as investments, VIPS, insurance coverage, and
debt. From Table 1 we observe that participation in VIPS over-represents the Italian condition.
As said (see Section 3), we do not aim at a representative survey of the Italian pension























































Table 2. Demographic and socio-economic profile of the sample.
Variables in
Matrix S
Profile Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 645 44 12 18 82 age age2
Overall sample Frequency % (100)
(N = 645)
Gender Males 509 78.91 gender (dummy where 1 stands for
males, 0 for females)Females 136 21.09
Dependants Having dependants 357 55.35
No dependants 288 44.65
Education Secondary school 30 4.65
High school 283 43.88
University degree 261 40.47
Master or Ph.D. 71 11.01
Profession Unemployed 26 4.03 fin-profession (dummy where 1
stands for financial professionals,




Financial professionals 281 43.57
Stability of working
contract
No stable contract 332 51.47 stable-workcont (dummy where
1 stands for holding a stable
working contract; 0 elsewhere)




























































Profile Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 645 44 12 18 82 age age2




< 500 euros 2 0.31 income-dol (mid-points in value of
the income classes proposed)(500–1000 euros) 10 1.55
(1000–2000 euros) 57 8.84
(2000–3000 euros) 129 20
(3000–4000 euros) 124 19.22
(4000–5000 euros) 92 14.26
(5000–6000 euros) 58 8.99
> 6000 euros 173 26.82




More than 3 86 13.33
Notes: This table summarizes sociodemographic features of the sample. Among the variables indicating the economic power of individuals, we omit to show financial wealth
and the value of real estate because these are highly correlated with income-dol and real-estate (numbers of houses). A selection of these sociodemographic features represents
regressors of Matrix S and is shown in the right column of this table. Here we specify also which condition we observe in the multivariate analysis for dummy variables. For
example, the gender dummy considers males (1) as opposed to females (0). For the profession feature, we use a fin-profession dummy, which is 1 for our financial professionals,
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heterogeneity, such as a behavioural or emotional component, and specific personal financial
choices. In this sense, characteristics of our sample benefit the study because they allow us to
observe quite a large number of individuals who opted for VIPS, whose numbers otherwise
would have been smaller.
This inclusion of financial professionals could induce biases in the VIPS demand due to con-
flict of interest, because these professionals might be either managing or selling the VIPS they
hold. In fact, the VIPS participation rate decreases from 49% to 39% when we exclude finan-
cial professionals from the overall sample. Therefore, we run a multivariate analysis on both
the overall sample and the restricted sample (asset managers and professional financial advisors
excluded). Coherently, in the multivariate framework, we observe also a second restricted sub-
sample obtained excluding pensioners because, due to the country-specific situation, they could
be relying on public pensions and have generated their choices for VIPS for reasons different
from long-range planning (e.g. investments with a favourable fiscal regime).
4.2 Models for probability of holding VIPS
The probability of holding VIPS is explained by a series of explanatory variables organized
in matrices/vectors, according to indications from existing literature (holding VIPS = 1; 0
otherwise):
Pr(VIPS = 1|S, F, C, P, E). (1)
Matrix S embraces a selection of sociodemographic variables, Matrix F includes information
on financial literacy and the financial decision process, Matrix C collects variables of individual
consumption and debt style, Matrix P gathers variables describing certain personality traits and
vector E is the variable for emotional arousal.
Demand for pension funds is highly affected by the nature and generosity of Social Security
systems and by the legal framework for private pension schemes (mandatory, quasi-mandatory
or voluntary), so that sociodemographic characteristics of subscribers may change accordingly.
At the macro-level, OECD (2012) shows that younger individuals are less likely to be enrolled
in privately managed funded pensions, especially in voluntary systems. Participation tends to
increase with age and also with income. Gender-wise findings are heterogeneous: a negative
female gap is remarkable in countries like the Netherlands and Ireland (16.4 and 10.3 percentage
points, respectively) and negligible in others like the UK, Germany and the USA. Finally, the
coverage rate is lower for workers having a temporary contract than for workers having a perma-
nent contract in all countries that provide such an information. At the micro-level, Hira, Rock,
and Loibl (2009), surveying high-income US workers ($75,000 income per year and above),
find that a combination of sociodemographic and behavioural variables are likely to influence
pension-fund participation and contribution maximization. Older and Caucasian individuals are
more likely to own a private pension, as well as to be early and active investors. Consistent con-
clusions are drawn in the UK by Clark, Knox-Hayes, and Strauss (2008), who find that income,
age and household status – in other words, having a spouse who contributes – are correlated with
saving for the future. These evidences motivate the list of sociodemographic variables that we
include in Matrix S as shown in Table 2: age, gender, profession, the presence of a stable working
contract (stable-workcont) and income level (income-dol).
Matrix F embraces conditions of financial literacy and financial decision process (Table 3)
according to literature indicating these conditions (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011).
















































10 B. Alemanni and C. Lucarelli
Table 3. Financial literacy and financial decision process (Matrix F).
Variable Value Overall sample
Frequency
(N = 645) % (100)














No use of financial
newspapers
585 90.7
Regular use of financial
newspapers
60 9.3
Notes: This table describes regressors that are included in Matrix F with the aim of depicting conditions of financial liter-
acy and financial decision process. The variable profess-advise describes the individuals’ decision process and indicates
whether they are guided by financial professionals. The variable use-financ-info indicates whether individuals are used
to reading financial newspapers and it is also a proxy of financial literacy.
private pension if they collect financial information from different sources. Information strategies
matter as well: individuals who engage in ex ante research – researching financial information
before speaking with an individual – and in ex post evaluation – reviewing investment mate-
rial received in the mail – are more likely to maximize their contribution. The list of Matrix F
variables is offered in Table 3 and includes having access to professional financial advice during
the decision-making process (profess-advise), and having regular access to financial information,
that also indicates a condition of financial literacy (use-financ-info).
Matrix C consists of variables describing individual consumer style and its implications for
saving capacity with respect to current expenses (positive-saving), for debt repayments (debt-
repayment), for access to informal debt agreements (use-informal-debt) and, finally, for overall
insurance coverage (IC; Table 4). In our empirical analysis, we do not explicitly collect infor-
mation about cognitive biases that individuals face in managing discount rates and probabilities
(Thaler 1981; Ainslie and Haslam 1992). We obtain indirect information about these biases from
consuming behaviours. For example, the positive-saving variable (the exceeding of monthly
income with respect to current expenses) is an indicator both of saving attitude and of a ten-
dency towards overconsumption, because we have cases of individuals, in our sample, that are
not able to save even if belonging to the highest income class.
Matrix P embraces variables describing certain personality traits, such as self-esteem and
impulsivity (Table 5). There is evidence that psychographic factors, such as conscientiousness,
may have a bearing on health and longevity (Friedman 2008; Kern and Friedman 2008). Con-
sequently, there may be a causal chain with psychographic factors affecting the propensity to
save partly due to considerations related to life expectancy. In addition, there is a large body
of literature suggesting that impulsivity might affect long-range planning attitude. For example,
Martin and Potts (2009) suggest that highly impulsive individuals are biased towards imme-
diate rewards when evaluating options and are less sensitive to the negative consequences of
their choices. Howlett, Kees, and Kemp (2008) find that a lack of self-regulation and a lower
propensity to consider future outcomes of current behaviours negatively influence long-term
financial decisions.
Impulsivity is measured via BIS-11 (Patton, Stanford, and Barratt 1995), which assesses the
multifactorial nature of impulsiveness: non-planning, motor and cognitive. Scores used in the
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Table 4. Consumer style and its financial implications (Matrix C).
Variable Description Overall sample
Frequency
(N = 645) % (100)
positive-saving Dummy variable which
is 1 if monthly income
exceeds current expenses
and individuals are able to
save; 0 if monthly income
is either just enough to
cover current expenses
or not sufficient to cover
current expenses and
individuals are obliged to







expenses and able to
generate saving
516 80
debt-repayment Monthly debt repayment in
value
0 (no debt repayment) 283 43.88
Below 200 euros 20 3.1
200–400 euros 63 9.77
400–600 euros 61 9.46
600–800 euros 55 8.53
800–1000 euros 62 9.61
1000–2000 euros 71 11.01
Above 2000 euros 30 4.65
use-informal-debt Dummy variable which
is 1 if individuals
resolve to informal debt
arrangements, 0 if not
No informal debt 541 83.88
Request for informal debt 104 16.12
IC Insurance coverage No policy 148 22.95
1 policy 159 24.65
2 policies 157 24.34
3 policies 101 15.66
4 policies 80 12.4
Notes: This table describes regressors that are included in Matrix C in order to characterize for individual consumer
style and saving/debt behaviour. We include positive-saving to indicate whether monthly income of interviewed exceeds
current expenses and they are able to save; debt-repayment, the value of the monthly debt repayment; use-informal-debt,
which indicates whether individuals ever asked for financial support from relatives, friends, colleagues or neighbours; and
IC, the number of insurance policies underwritten, among the four: life insurance, health insurance, casualty insurance
and indemnity insurance.
reflects a lack of planning for the future; 2) motor impulsiveness (bismot), which reflects a ten-
dency to act without forethought; and (3) attentional impulsiveness (biscog), which is largely
characterized by a selective concentration on one aspect of the environment while ignoring other
aspects.
Finally, we include the indicator of emotional arousal (Table 6), which we calculate as the
mean value of SCR recorded for each individual before any selection from disadvantageous
decks (A and B), within the last set of 80 choices of the trial, strictly following the protocols
of Bechara and Damasio (2002). We exploit benefits of SCR measurement, which is considered
a cheap, unobtrusive and reliable proxy for neural and brain activation (Figner and Murphy
2011), mainly referred to as emotions (Bechara, Damasio, and Damasio 2000). We assume that a
tendency towards arousal, shown by individuals during the task, reveals a behavioural inclination
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Table 5. Personality traits (Matrix P).
Variable Observed condition Overall sample
Frequency
(N = 645) % (100)
self-esteem Dummy variable, 1 if
the individual declares
having self-esteem in
her decision process, 0
otherwise
Absence of self-esteem 549 85.12
Presence of self-esteem 96 14.88
N M SD Min. Max.
bisnpl BIS score non-planning
impulsiveness
645 0.25 0.04 0.15 0.36
bismot BIS score motor
impulsiveness
645 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.34
biscog BIS score attentional
impulsiveness
645 0.14 0.03 0.08 0.24
Notes: This table describes regressors that are included in Matrix P to include information about some personality
traits. Self-esteem is a dummy variable whose value is 1 if the individual declares having self-esteem in her decision
process. Impulsivity scores, desegregated, result from the BIS-11 questionnaire of Patton, Stanford, and Barratt (1995).
We provide, for the valid number of observations/individuals (N = 645), the mean (M ), the standard deviation (SD), the
lowest (Min.) and the highest (Max.) value of the BIS score for non-planning impulsiveness (bisnpl), of the BIS score
for motor impulsiveness (bismot) and of the BIS score for attentional impulsiveness (biscog). BIS scores are relative
to 100.
systems (Thaler and Shefrin 1981; Shefrin and Thaler 1988) and the empirical neuroscience
findings of McClure et al. (2004, 2007).
4.3 Research hypotheses
We investigate whether behavioural individualities affect long-range planning attitude. There-
fore, we examine whether consumer style, personality traits and psychophysiological inclinations
Table 6. Emotional activation (vector E).
Variable N M SD Min. Max.
SCR 641 0.178 0.167 0.006 1.333
Notes: This table provides information about the emotional arousal shown by participants during the psycho-
physiological experiment. From the IGT-SCR experiment, we obtain a measurement for emotional activation: it is the
individual SCR shown before disadvantageous decks (A and B), after the trial period of the first 20 choices, accord-
ing to the traditional protocol of Bechara and Damasio (2002). The SCR is measured by the voltage drop between
two electrodes placed on the skin surface of the individual running the experiment. Changes in SCR occur when the
eccrine sweat glands, which are innervated by the sympathetic autonomic nervous system fibres, receive a signal from
a certain part of the brain. Recording of SCR starts at least 10 minutes before the beginning of the IGT and continues
throughout. Sample rate is set at 1 Hz. Among 645 subjects, four individuals were excluded from the analysis because
they never selected disadvantageous decks, the condition for our SCR variable computation. Precisely, this table offers,
for the valid number of observations/individuals (N = 641), the mean (M ), the standard deviation (SD), the lowest
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influence the probability of holding VIPS, while controlling for sociodemographic characteris-
tics. As anticipated, we rely on information about individuals who effectively hold VIPS in
real life.
Sociodemographic characteristics here are mainly used as a control variable, and we formulate
hypotheses gathered from the literature (Clark, Knox-Hayes, and Strauss 2008; Hira, Rock, and
Loibl 2009) and OECD findings:
H1.a: The probability of holding VIPS increases with age; nevertheless, given the country-specific
situation, we expect that this positive relationship reduces its intensity for more mature cohorts of
individuals.
H1.b: The probability of holding VIPS increases with income.
H1.c: Having a stable contract increases the probability of holding VIPS.
H1.d: Being an active investor increases the probability of holding VIPS.
With reference to Matrix F, from the literature (Lusardi and Mitchell 2007, 2008, 2009, 2011;
Hira, Rock, and Loibl 2009) we would expect the following:
H2.a: The probability of holding VIPS increases if the subject relies on professional advice.
H2.b: The probability of holding VIPS increases with access to financial information, which is also
a proxy for financial literacy.
With reference to Matrix C, and with reference to the literature on behavioural life-cycle
consumer choices, we would expect the following:
H3: The probability of holding VIPS increases with saving attitude and decreases with overconsump-
tion.
With reference to Matrix P, mainly from Martin and Potts (2009) and Howlett, Kees, and
Kemp (2008), we would expect the following:
H4: The probability of holding VIPS decreases with individual impulsivity.
With reference to vector E, inspired by Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Shefrin and Thaler (1988)
and McClure et al. (2004, 2007), we would expect the following:
H5: The probability of holding VIPS decreases with emotional activation, as a sort of behavioural
inclination towards a predominance of System 1, limbic–myopic, over System 2, pre-frontal–
forward-looking.
5. Results and discussion
We estimate the probit models of Equation (1) reporting marginal effects in Table 7, includ-
ing all the individuals of the sample, and excluding asset managers and professional financial
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Table 7. Multivariate analysis for the probability of holding VIPS.
Whole sample
Asset managers and financial
advisors excluded Pensioners excluded




Age 0.047 0.014*** 0.029 0.015* 0.051 0.020**
age2 − 0.0005 0.0001*** − 0.0004 0.0002** − 0.0006 0.0002**
gender 0.027 0.054 0.014 0.067 0.033 0.057
fin-profession 0.158 0.049*** − 0.059 0.090 0.159 0.050***
stable-workcont 0.122 0.044*** 0.164 0.056*** 0.097 0.047**
income-dol − 0.034 0.049 0.010 0.054 − 0.060 0.053
profess-advise 0.101 0.052* 0.139 0.057** 0.074 0.055
use-financ-info 0.108 0.079 0.095 0.075 0.115 0.089
positive-saving 0.139 0.056** 0.133 0.062** 0.140 0.061**
debt-repayment 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.007
use-informal-debt − 0.117 0.057** − 0.187 0.062*** − 0.110 0.060*
IC 0.085 0.018*** 0.083 0.021*** 0.092 0.019***
self-esteem 0.099 0.045** 0.060 0.058 0.086 0.046*
Bisnpl − 1.652 0.669** − 1.274 0.778* − 1.886 0.718***
bismot 0.016 0.722 0.492 0.872 − 0.277 0.784
Biscog 0.971 0.863 0.965 1.033 1.205 0.924




LR chi2(17) 133.000 89.690 94.160
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-likelihood − 377.58 − 227.98 − 347.325
Pseudo-R2 0.150 0.164 0.119
Notes: This table offers estimations of probit regressions, reporting marginal effects, where the dependent variable is the
probability that the interviewee holds a VIPS (VIPS dummy variable = 1). Independent variables are those included in
matrices/vector of Equation (1). As far as sociodemographic variables are concerned (Matrix S), we include age and its
quadratic term age2, gender as male as opposed to female; a dummy fin-profession for financial professionals; a dummy
stable-workcont for having a stable working contract as opposed to not; income-dol as mid-points in value of the income
classes proposed, as in Table 1. Then, within Matrix F, we include profess-advise, whether they rely on a professional
advice in their financial decision; and use-financ-info, whether they are used to reading specialized financial information.
Moreover, we have variables of Matrix C: positive-saving, to indicate whether monthly income exceeds current expenses
and individuals are able to save; debt-repayment: mid-points in value of the monthly debt repayment classes, as in Table
4; use-informal-debt, to indicate whether individuals resort to informal debt arrangements; and IC, for their insurance
coverage. Finally, we have variables indicating some personality traits (Matrix P) in terms of self-esteem and impulsivity,
with the three BIS scores (bisnpl, non-planning impulsiveness; bismot, motor impulsiveness; biscog, attentional impul-
siveness). Vector E with the emotional arousal before risky choices (SCR) concludes the list of regressors. Variables
income-dol, debt-repayment and SCR are used in log. The column dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variables from
0 to 1.
aAmong 645 subjects, 4 individuals were excluded because they never selected disadvantageous decks, the condition
that allows SCR computation.
bFrom 645 subjects we excluded 84 professional asset managers and 150 professional financial advisors. The dummy
fin-profession still comprehends online traders. Among these 411 residual individuals, two subjects never selected disad-
vantageous decks and were therefore excluded.
cFrom 645 subjects we excluded 72 pensioners. Among these 573 residual individuals, 3 subjects never selected disad-
vantageous decks and were therefore excluded. This figure is consistent with point (2) because one individual is both a
pensioner and a financial advisor.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level.
**Statistical significance at the 5% level.
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a peculiar behaviour concerning retirement plans. Financial professionals might opt for self-
producing retirement integrative investments, and pensioners should belong to those cohorts of
generations still largely relying on public pensions, nevertheless results are robust throughout all
the samples.
As far as sociodemographic variables are concerned, there is no evidence of a gender role on
long-range choices, while age is able to predict demand for VIPS and with a U-shape relation-
ship, as expected (positive sign of age and negative sign of the quadratic term age2), because
people tend to underwrite VIPS when ageing, but with a decreasing intensity as they age, as
expected. Therefore, H1.a is accepted, consistently in all three sub-samples. Conversely, H1.b
cannot be accepted because the income-dol variable is never significant in our estimations. It
seems that the economic power of individuals has no effect in predicting the demand for VIPS,
when other variables are controlled for. H1.c is largely accepted, instead, because having a sta-
ble contract (stable-workcont) always significantly and positively predicts holding VIPS, even
when restricting the sample and adding further variables. In opposition, H1.d is to be selectively
accepted, because being a financial professional, as a proxy for being an active investor, increases
the probability of holding VIPS, but only when using the whole sample, that is, when including
asset managers and professional financial advisors. This raises a concern that the increased prob-
ability of holding VIPS, for these professionals, might not be related to their active/conscious
involvement in financial issues, but is rather linked to their business (i.e. they opt for schemes
either they manage or sell). Within financial literacy Matrix F, our results are not immediately
in line with the findings of Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2008, 2009, 2011). While the profess-
advise variable is always positively significant, the use-financ-info, which is also a proxy for
financial literacy, plays a fragile role, because in the estimations in Table 7 it is never significant.
Therefore, only H2.a can be unambiguously accepted.
Moving to Matrix C, H3 is largely accepted because the probability of holding VIPS increases
with saving attitude and decreases with overconsumption, as shown by the significant and posi-
tive sign of the positive-saving variable, in all our samples of estimations. The same consistent
role is played by the use-informal-debt variable, and its interpretation is enriched if it is joined
with the debt-repayment variable. In fact, the latter is never significant, indicating that having
debt tout court has no relevance for long-range investment choices. Instead, the use-informal-
debt variable always has a significant and negative effect on VIPS holding. This means that those
individuals who are used to relying on informal debt solutions, that is, requesting financial sup-
port from friends and family members, colleagues or neighbours, are less likely to have access
to VIPS. Interpretation is twofold: on the one hand, informal debt arrangements may represent a
source of social capital, which might induce people to substitute formal long-range investments,
such as VIPS, with the availability of this kind of resource. On the other hand, informal debt
may also play the role of lender of last resort, used when regular debt from financial institutions
is interdicted, as a consequence of over-indebtedness. The consequent deduction is that those
individuals more likely to have access to last-resort debt solutions are less likely to hold VIPS.
Finally, the significance of the variable IC, which indicates the intensity of insurance coverage
by the number of policies underwritten, may testify, first, that VIPS are jointly offered with
insurance contracts, as a cross-selling policy; and second, that those agents inclined to avoid
ambiguity, thanks to insurance policies, are also more likely to hold VIPS.
With reference to psychographic variables, bispl is significant and has a negative sign, as
expected. Therefore, H4 is accepted: the probability of holding VIPS decreases with individ-
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is non-planning impulsiveness (bisnpl), which reflects an individual lack of mind-set for plan-
ning for the future. This result is fascinating and supports evidence that long-range planning
attitude is driven also by individual psychographic features, such as impulsivity; nevertheless,
the remaining variable in Matrix P is significant only when the whole sample is considered
(self-esteem).
Conversely, the last inclusion of emotional variables, with the vector E, significantly increases
the predictive power of the model, across all the samples considered.11 The sign of the relation-
ship with the variable SCR is negative, and it provides support for H5. We find evidence that the
probability of holding VIPS decreases the higher the personal inclinations of the individual to
be affected by emotional arousal. It seems to support that when System 1, the limbic, is prevail-
ing ceteris paribus over System 2, the pre-frontal, forward-looking behaviour is reduced, in turn
reducing the likelihood of holding long-range investment plans.
6. Conclusions
Retirement is about dreams, fears and changes, not just money and schedules. Self-determination
and self-control influence retirements and pension choices. In declining welfare systems, stable
consumption throughout life increasingly depends on individual long-range planning attitude.
Many obstacles impede forward-looking financial decision-making: theoretical and empirical
research supports that individuals tend to privilege present over future consumptions.
Our paper contributes to the understanding of how behavioural traits affect real-life long-range
investment choices. We provide empirical evidence that psychophysiological heterogeneity plays
a role in predicting the demand for VIPS. Sociodemographic variables and individual economic
behaviours in relation to savings, consumption and indebtedness mainly confirm traditional
results from existing literature. We contribute to it by showing that additional psychologi-
cal and psychophysiological components are significantly related to the probability of holding
long-range investment plans. Ceteris paribus, agents with high impulsivity, and specifically a
non-planning impulsiveness, and with a tendency to be affected by emotional arousal, in terms
of somatic response to monetary stimuli, are less likely to demand VIPS.
At the individual level, our research makes clear that demand for VIPS is regularly affected
by psychological components influencing time preferences: individuals who are less inclined to
emotional arousal and less impulsive are likely to discount less severely future consumption and
to be more willing to plan for retirement; others, who are more emotive and impulsive, tend to
weight present consumption too highly, and to delay, or neglect, their access to retirement integra-
tive schemes. Our results suggest that these behavioural characteristics might compel individuals
to make (or not make) financial choices that determine, in the long range, the amount of money
necessary to preserve their life-quality standards.
Implications of these findings are remarkable for both communication and regulation. As long
as impulsive or emotional individuals lack a long-range planning attitude, in other words, a capa-
bility to plan for retirement, communication campaigns regarding the individuals’ choices, and
the potential implications these choices have for their financial well-being in retirement, should
be considered. Benartzi, Iyengar, and Previtero (2007) show that affective communication might
help increase willingness to save. Coherently, communication campaigns regarding individuals’
retirement choices should be specifically designed to target impulsive or emotional individu-
als. Time preferences can also be manipulated thanks to an emotional visualization of self. For
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renderings of themselves will cause them to allocate more resources towards the future. In gen-
eral, as our results show, managing via communication or other tools the emotional component
in choices is fundamental to improving long-range planning decisions.
Additional implications at the policy level could be considered, as well. While reforming
pension systems, policy-makers could capitalize on our findings by taking special care in commu-
nicating the role that VIPS can play in old-age welfare. In designing a default option, they should
put special emphasis on the emotional consequences of different features such as contribution
rate escalation or financial design. Default options seem to be important not only because they
might foster participation decisions, but because they complement education and information,
which alone might be insufficient, as we show, to induce a long-range planning culture.
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Notes
1. Private pension schemes are expected to grow as pension reforms in these countries lead to a reduction in pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) public pension benefits, traditionally organized as defined benefits (DB) plans.
2. An individual is best understood as a succession of selves with different preferences and different levels of awareness
of such preferences. While most of the time these systems interact synergistically to determine behaviour, at times
they may compete, producing different responses to the same information.
3. The idea of multiple systems of processing is not unique to decision-making and has been developed, in strikingly
similar ways, by many thinkers in philosophy, psychology, neuroscience and medicine over the past several hundred
years. The earliest accounts of dual-process theories in cognitive psychology date back to the 1970s and 1980s
(Wason and Evans 1975; Evans 1989) and have become the focus of much interest in contemporary research on
these topics (Evans and Over 1996; Sloman 1996; Stanovich 1999, 2011; Stanovich and West 2000; Kahneman and
Frederick 2002; Barbey and Sloman 2007; Evans 2007, 2008; Kahneman 2011). Although there are nuances specific
to each theoretical conception, for the most part these dual-process models are all structurally very similar.
4. An overview of the project is offered in Lucarelli and Brighetti (2010), where they refer to a first set of 445
















































18 B. Alemanni and C. Lucarelli
5. We take into consideration, properly in multivariate analysis, those conditions under which financial decisions could
be affected by familial context (e.g. economic capability is typically referred to as overall familial condition) or by
other forms of external influence (i.e. the presence of professional financial advice).
6. Even if these individuals make professional financial decisions, we always asked them to answer based on their
personal financial decisions.
7. More than 80% of our sample are males. An analysis of the Istat annual household surveys shows that men are
predominantly heads of household in around 70% of cases (Istat 2011).
8. For a description of the task, visit the online appendix: http://www.risktolerance.univpm.it/IGTSCR.
9. Even if gains and losses are only simulated, a similar performance pattern emerges when the nature of the incen-
tive used is varied, for example, when giving real money instead of facsimile reinforcers (Bowman and Turnbull
2003).
10. In the restricted sample, the fin-profession includes online traders, that is, those individuals specializing exclusively
in short-term trading strategy, either professionally or as a secondary occupation.
11. The p-value of the LR test, for the full model compared to the restricted one, is .0053 with 641 individuals, .0021
with 409 individuals, and .0359 with 570 individuals.
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